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Book Review Essay
Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law
THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Jack L. Goldsmith† & Eric A. Posner.‡
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 226. $29.95.

Reviewed by Paul Schiff Berman*
If the 1990s were for many a time of optimism about the efficacy of
international law and legal institutions,1 the first decade of the twenty-first
century has brought a backlash, at least in the United States. The Bush
administration’s hostility to international law is well documented,2
Republicans in Congress are decrying the mere citation of foreign or
international sources in U.S. Supreme Court opinions,3 and a cadre of
international law scholars, seemingly motivated by concerns that
international legal norms might pose undue limitations on state prerogatives
or democratic processes, are arguing against the implementation of such
norms domestically.4 Even those who are inclined to be more sympathetic to
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1. See, e.g., Philippe Sands, Of Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International
Law, 33 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 527, 536 (2001) (discussing legal decisions from the 1990s
concerning human rights and trade and suggesting that these decisions have, “[i]n a way that was
not necessarily predictable, . . . made a connection between international law and a broader set of
values than those to which states have given express approval”).
2. Indeed, the administration’s official National Defense Strategy goes so far as to lump
together the mere use of international “judicial processes” and the use of terrorism. According to
the document, both are “strategies of the weak” that threaten “our strength as a nation state.” U.S.
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6
(2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/d20050408strategy.pdf.
3. See American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 4118, 108th Cong. § 3 (2004)
(prohibiting the federal courts from employing the “constitution, laws, administrative rules,
executive orders, directives, policies, or judicial decisions of any international organization or
foreign state” (other than English common law) in interpreting the U.S. Constitution).
4. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of
International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 91, 103 (2000) (noting that within international institutions, “consent of the governed is
still lacking, democratic legitimacy in the long run is still lacking”); Curtis A. Bradley,
International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV.
‡
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international human rights law have purported to show, through quantitative
analysis, that human rights treaties may not affect actual state behavior.5
Many of these attacks, however, misconceive the ways in which
international law is most likely to operate. Because international law
generally is not backed by coercive force, it of course does not literally bind
state actors. Thus, if international law affects behavior at all, it does so far
more subtly. For example, it may slowly change attitudes in large
populations, effecting shifts in ideas of appropriate state behavior. In
addition, international legal norms may well empower constituencies within
a domestic polity and provide them with a language for influencing state
policy, thereby affording them leverage that they would not otherwise have
had at their disposal.
Such subtle processes may not, at least on the surface, seem to play a
role in constraining state behavior. And they cannot necessarily be measured
in immediately quantifiable ways. But, over time, we may see changes that
are more profound than those brought about by an ephemeral coercive statute
enacted by a legislature. Thus, if we want to study whether international law
has real effects, we need to analyze these processes rather than limit our gaze
to the question of whether international law binds states coercively.
It is for this reason that the latest addition to the international law
backlash genre, The Limits of International Law, by Jack Goldsmith and Eric
Posner,6 is so disappointing. Tendentious and unpersuasive, the book
deploys the simplifying assumptions of rational choice theory in an attempt
to demonstrate that international law has no independent valence whatsoever.
Rather, according to the authors, each state single-mindedly pursues its
rational state interest and therefore obeys international legal norms only to
the extent that such norms serve those pre-existing interests. Thus, they
argue, international law is sometimes important, but only as a mechanism by
which nation–states negotiate power, not as an independent limitation on the
prerogatives of state governments.
Yet, while there is certainly much work still to be done to fully study
the variety of ways in which international legal pronouncements might or
might not affect the behavior of state and non-state actors, The Limits of
International Law advances the discussion hardly at all. This is because, as
with much rational choice analysis,7 Goldsmith and Posner must start with a

1557, 1595 (2003) (arguing that international delegations raise “delegation concerns” in much the
same manner as the “delegation concerns at issue in domestic transfers of authority”); Viet D. Dinh,
Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 867, 871–72 (2004) (characterizing international
institutions and norms as threats to the modern nation–state).
5. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J.
1935, 2020–25 (2002) (arguing that signing human rights treaties does not correlate with increased
human rights compliance).
6. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
7. For a critique of rational choice analysis, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1545 (1998) (“Traditional law and economics is
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series of assumptions that effectively clear away almost all of the ways in
which international law and legal institutions are most likely to be effective.
First, they assume that state interests exist independently of the social
context within which the interests are formed. But a policymaker’s idea of
what is in the state’s interest is always and necessarily affected by ideas of
appropriate action, and these ideas are likely to be shaped—even if
unconsciously—by legal norms, including the norms of international law.8
Moreover, such government officials, especially in a democracy, are at least
somewhat responsive to popular opinion, and such opinion is also likely to be
shaped by a variety of forces, again including the moral pull of international
legal norms. As sociolegal scholars have long described, legal norms can
effect changes in legal consciousness that in turn alter the categories of our
thought, such that they help determine what we are likely to see as a viable
policy option in the first place. Indeed, the particular brand of rational choice
theory adopted by Goldsmith and Posner ignores even the insights of law and
economics itself, which long ago adopted a framework that includes
behavioral psychology within its analysis.9
Second, Goldsmith and Posner assume that, in any given setting, a state
actually has a single, definable set of interests. Thus, even as rational choice
theory has long been attacked for its reliance on the idea that individuals
have unitary definable interests,10 Goldsmith and Posner multiply the
problem by asserting that entire states have such interests. Yet, given that
states are made up of multiple bureaucrats with various spheres of authority,
political ideologies, institutional loyalties, and interests that range from the
goal of re-election, to the need to curry favor with particular interest groups,
to the aim of career advancement, the idea that a state could have a single
interest is simply unfathomable. And that is not even counting the myriad
forces outside of government—NGOs, editorial writers, campaign
contributors, political movements, and so on—that all exert influence on
government actors and all may themselves be influenced by and may

largely based on the standard assumptions of neoclassical economics. These assumptions are
sometimes useful but often false.”). See also DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 11 (1994)
(“Too often prescriptive conclusions . . . are floated on empirically dubious rational choice
hypotheses.”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060–70 (2000)
(critiquing rational choice theory with evidence from the behavioral sciences).
8. As Andrew Moravcsik puts it: “Societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state
behavior by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the
strategic calculations of governments.” Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A
Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 513 (1997).
9. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (containing
contributions by law and economics scholars whose arguments are grounded in behavioral
psychology principals).
10. See generally id. (providing numerous examples demonstrating that individual interests are
variable, rather than static, and depend on context).
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consciously deploy the norms of international law in order to press varying
agendas.
Third, Goldsmith and Posner set their work in opposition to what they
describe as “cosmopolitan theory,” which, they assert, “argues that states
have a duty . . . to act on the basis of global rather than state welfare.”11
Thus, they equate cosmopolitanism with a kind of utopian universalist
utilitarianism. But cosmopolitanism is potentially a far more nuanced theory
than that, providing a framework for recognizing multiple community
affiliations and multiple norm-generating entities, only some of which map
neatly onto the fixed territorial boundaries of the nation–state system.
As a result of their three radically simplifying assumptions, Goldsmith
and Posner end up arguing against a straw man. Only the most diehard
internationalists would suggest that a state already completely united behind
both a set of interests and a strategy for attaining those interests will practice
self-denial solely because that strategy contravenes international law. So, of
course, if one starts from the premise that there are pre-existing unitary
interests, it will be difficult to find examples where international legal norms
appear to have any effect.
But it is ludicrous to assume that coercively preventing states from
doing that which they have already decided to do is the only way of
evaluating the efficacy of international law. Indeed, even in the domestic
context, legal norms are effective largely because people imbibe those norms
and adopt them as their own, not because a police officer stands behind the
next corner waiting to pounce. And law’s impact is not found only in literal
obedience to rules, but in the everyday categories of our discourse. When we
casually refer to “private” property, “married” couples, the “rights” of
people, and so on, we are adopting and deploying law’s power even if we are
not aware of the fact. Thus, over time, what a state considers to be in its
interest is likely to change, and those changes will often be at least partly the
product of changes in legal consciousness, which is in turn shaped by
international law. Moreover, various actors within the state bureaucracy (or
those seeking to affect bureaucratic decisionmaking) will use international
legal norms to craft political arguments within their own polities. Again,
such arguments will, at least sometimes, effectively shift popular or political
consensus.
Thus, whatever the limits of international law may be, the analytical
framework Goldsmith and Posner construct will not help us find them. In
this Book Review Essay, I first outline their argument and focus particularly
on the crucial sets of assumptions they apply to their analysis. Then, drawing
on sociolegal scholarship and actual examples of international law as it
operates on the ground, I discuss two ways in which international law can
have a significant impact, both of which are ignored by Goldsmith and

11. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 14.
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Posner. First, I explore the concept of legal consciousness and suggest that,
over time, international law norms may alter what both governmental actors
and larger populations view as “right,” “natural,” “just,” or “in their interest.”
Second, I discuss various instances in which individual constituencies both
within and outside of government have deployed international legal norms to
gain leverage and affect state policy choices. Finally, I take on the distorted
view of cosmopolitanism used by Goldsmith and Posner, and suggest that
cosmopolitanism potentially offers a far more useful analytical lens for
conceptualizing the ways in which multiple lawmaking communities
construct, disseminate, and negotiate legal norms than the schematic
simplifications of internationalized rational choice theory.
To some degree, of course, my analysis reprises old debates between
international relations realism on the one hand and constructivism on the
other. For decades realists have relied on the idea that states pursue unitary
sets of interests (generally power and riches) and that international law is
only instrumental.12 Likewise, constructivists have long argued that interests
cannot exist independently of social context and that international law plays a
role in shaping the contexts in which interests arise.13 Yet, apparently the
12. See, e.g., EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS, 1919–1939, at 85–88
(Harper & Row 1964) (1939) (rejecting internationalism/cosmopolitanism and stating that the
principles commonly invoked in international politics were “unconscious reflexions of national
policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time”); HANS J.
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 5 (5th ed.
1973) (noting that the “main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the
landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power”); KENNETH
N. WALZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 122 (1979) (arguing that “although states may be
disposed to react to international constraints and incentives,” they do so only if such actions
conform with the state’s internal interests); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of “International Law,”
NAT’L INT., Winter 1989–1990, at 3 (arguing against the importance of international law); Francis
A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and
International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 193, 201 (1980) (arguing that World War II itself
made clear that states cannot rely solely on international law to protect their interests).
13. See, e.g., MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 3
(1996) (asserting that states’ interests “are shaped by internationally shared norms and values that
structure and give meaning to international political life”); THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse et al., eds. 1999) (collecting
essays on state internalization of international human rights norms); John Gerard Ruggie, What
Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52
INT’L ORG. 855, 857-62 (1998) (tracing the roots of social constructivism to the work of Emile
Durkheim and Max Weber); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391, 394 (1992) (stating his intention to develop “a
constructivist argument…on behalf of the liberal claim that international institutions can transform
state identities and interests”). The related discourse of transnational legal process has stressed the
ways in which states internalize international norms into domestic law. See, e.g., Harold Hongju
Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 204 (1996) (“As transnational actors
interact, they create patterns of behavior and generate norms of external conduct which they in turn
internalize.”); see also Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74
IND. L.J. 1397, 1399 (1999) (contending that international human rights are enforced “through a
transnational legal process of institutional interaction, interpretation of legal norms, and attempts to
internalize those norms into domestic legal systems”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2602 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA
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battle must be joined once more. The vision of international law that
Goldsmith and Posner espouse, though newly dressed up in the trappings of
rational choice theory and econometric analysis, is at bottom just the same
old realist vision. And as long as theorists continue to view international
relations as merely a real-life version of the game of “Risk” or “Stratego,”
devoid of sociological, psychological, or even political complexity, those
who seek a more nuanced understanding of international law will need to
respond.
I.

Rational Choice and International Law

The central thesis of The Limits of International Law is easily stated.
According to Goldsmith and Posner, international legal norms, though
sometimes useful to states in pursuing their own interests, have no actual
constraining effect on states. The authors argue that states are never pulled
into compliance with international law if such compliance would be contrary
to the state’s interests. Instead, they suggest that state behavior is best
captured by four game theoretic models describing how states strategically
pursue their interests in various forms of cooperation and competition with
each other. In this analysis, international law is seen only as a product of
state interest and not as a limit on the pursuit of that interest. Significantly,
though this claim purports to be merely descriptive—presenting a theory of
how states actually behave in the world—the normative thrust of the book is
difficult to miss. Goldsmith and Posner clearly believe that international law
should not be treated as an independent check on state action, and their
argument is squarely aimed at those, both within government and outside of
it, who would view international law as a constraint. At bottom, therefore,
Goldsmith and Posner seek to change attitudes about international law that
they see as an unnecessary drag on the power of states.
Yet, like the economist in the old joke who, in order to open a can in the
forest, must first assume a can opener, Goldsmith and Posner depend for
their analysis almost entirely on a set of simplifying assumptions. Indeed,
their principal argument about international law lacking constraining effect
makes sense only if one buys into their simplified framework. To be sure,
they rightly acknowledge those assumptions at the beginning of the book.
However, mere acknowledgment of the assumptions cannot substitute for
reasoned argument as to why those assumptions are justified. And here the
justifications are cursory at best. This Part therefore discusses the
assumptions at some length and then briefly outlines the basic trajectory of
the argument that follows.

HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS (1995) and THOMAS M. FRANK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS (1995)) (arguing that international law scholars need an “account of transnational
legal process: the complex process of institutional interaction whereby global norms are not just
debated and interpreted, but ultimately internalized by domestic legal systems”).
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The crucial set of assumptions from which Goldsmith and Posner begin
is contained in the statement that “states act rationally to further their
interests.”14 This phrase includes at least three simplifications that are
intrinsic to the book’s analytical framework: (1) that state interests can arise
independently of the international law context itself; (2) that a state could
ever have a single identifiable interest; and (3) that states act rationally to
further those interests.
Yet, while properly acknowledging their
assumptions, Goldsmith and Posner provide only the thinnest of justifications
for employing them.
As to the first assumption, Goldsmith and Posner state baldly that they
“take state interests at any particular time to be an unexplained given.”15
However, as will be discussed further in Part II of this Book Review Essay,
such an assumption ignores the processes by which states (or individuals)
develop preferences or interests in the first place. Goldsmith and Posner
concede that constructivists have long made this point by arguing that
international legal norms and institutions influence not only conceptions of
what is in the state’s interest, but also the cognitive categories through which
the very idea of interests is viewed.16 In addition, cognitive psychology17 and
even behavioral law and economics18 acknowledge the need to study how
interests arise.
In response, Goldsmith and Posner suggest first that such constructivist
claims cannot be proved one way or the other.19 It is unclear, however, what
the authors would accept as proof in this regard. As we will see, there is a
large body of sociolegal data demonstrating (or at least strongly suggesting)

14. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 4.
15. Id. at 9.
16. See id. at 8–9 (acknowledging that constructivists seek to show that state interests can be
influenced by international law and institutions).
17. For discussions using cognitive psychology to show how cognitive categories and narratives
affect thought, see generally ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 9
(2000) (analyzing theories of categorization and noting that “categories are made in the mind and
not found in the world”) (emphasis in original); STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST:
LAW, LIFE AND MIND 105–06 (2001) (arguing that narrative “shape[s] our expectations and
perceptions with respect to what we deem credible” and “standard legal scholarship is just a
particularly powerful kind of rational argument”). Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge the
challenge of cognitive psychology but only with regard to cognitive errors, GOLDSMITH & POSNER,
supra note 6, at 8, not the idea that cognition is itself determined by the categories we use.
Moreover, they dismiss cognitive psychology because it “has not yet produced a comprehensive
theory of human (or state) behavior that can guide research in international law and relations.” Id.
(citation omitted). In this statement, Goldsmith and Posner seem to elevate the imperatives of their
normative analysis above the empirical question of whether their theory actually describes human
behavior.
18. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 10 (contending that a better
understanding of how interests arise may lead to “better uses of law as an instrument of social
ordering”).
19. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 9 (acknowledging that, while they doubt the
constructivist argument that international law and institutions can affect state interests, they “cannot
prove the point”).
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that legal norms become internalized as part of the categories of human
thought. For example, when people think in terms of “human rights,” they
are internalizing a set of philosophical and legal constructs, many of which
are imbibed unconsciously. If true, this would certainly be an example of
international law having an effect, regardless of whether such a process of
norm-internalization can ever be proven. Thus, the use of the word “proof”
here is a dodge. Of course such complex psychological and cognitive
causation will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove definitively. But that
does not mean that any view one may have about how interests arise is
therefore equally correct. Accordingly, it is insufficient for Goldsmith and
Posner to state that, since neither side can “prove” whether or not
international legal norms affect conceptions of state interest, they can just
move on as if no challenge to their framework had been made. Moreover, it
should go without saying that there is nothing particularly “rigorous” or
“empirical” about using game theory to speculate about how states act in
certain situations, and so the implication that Goldsmith and Posner are
somehow providing a more factually grounded account is unsupportable.
Even more surprisingly, Goldsmith and Posner write that, even if one
could demonstrate that state interests are themselves constructed by reference
to international law (an idea they call the “endogenization of the state’s
interest”20), such an understanding of how interests arise would not
necessarily “lead to a more powerful understanding of how states behave
with respect to international law.”21 Accordingly, they write, “[w]e provide
our theory in the pages that follow, and we leave it to critics to decide
whether constructivism provides a better theory of international law.”22
Needless to say, this is not an argument at all. Rather, Goldsmith and Posner
appear ready to ignore constructivism even if it could be proved to their
satisfaction that the constructivist insights were correct.
Turning to their second assumption, Goldsmith and Posner start from
the premise that the state can have a unitary set of interests independent of
the multiple political players involved and their various personal and
professional ambitions, desires, or aims. They acknowledge, however, that
“[s]tate interests are not always easy to determine, because the state
subsumes many institutions and individuals that obviously do not share
identical preferences about outcomes.”23 One would think that this fact alone
would pose a major hurdle for the rational choice analysis Goldsmith and
Posner wish to undertake. Indeed, public choice theory has long sought to
show that any idea that a political body has a single “interest” or “intent” is

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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misguided.24 Yet Goldsmith and Posner respond with what is essentially a
one-sentence throw away. Despite the difficulties inherent in determining a
single state interest, they write: “Nonetheless, a state—especially one with
well-ordered political institutions—can make coherent decisions based upon
identifiable preferences, or interests, and it is natural and common to explain
state action on the international plane in terms of the primary goal or goals
the state seeks to achieve.”25
Again, this response provides no justification for their assumption
whatsoever. After all, whether it is “common” to speak of a state having
unitary interests is completely irrelevant; the question is whether it is
accurate to do so. And as to whether speaking of state interests is “natural,”
the statement is so vague that it has almost no content at all. Perhaps most
importantly, what can it mean to say that a state makes “coherent decisions
based upon identifiable preferences”? To take a particularly salient
contemporary example, what was the “coherently” defined state interest in
invading Iraq? To this day no such interest has been defined or produced,
and the diverse actors involved undoubtedly had very different interests and
objectives. Thus, some may have wanted to control access to Middle Eastern
oil, others might have sought to establish a model democracy in the region,
still others might have wanted to remove a threat to Israel, and conceivably
some people might actually have believed the stated reason, that Saddam
Hussein posed a military threat. At the same time, domestic political
strategists within the administration might simply have been counting on
(short-term) political gains from being at war. Accordingly, no account of
the Iraq invasion would be even close to believable if it did not include the
incoherent jumble of the players, as well as the various forces arrayed in
opposition to the invasion: old-style realists, soft-power legalists and
internationalists, peace activists, much of the military officer corps and
intelligence community, and so on. In any event, the one sentence
explanation Goldsmith and Posner provide to defend their focus on unitary
state interests is woefully inadequate to justify such an important central
premise of the book.
Finally, Goldsmith and Posner assume that, once a unitary interest is
formulated, states then act rationally to pursue those interests, an implausible
assumption (as the Iraq example makes clear) that fails to account for the
complicated and highly irrational ways in which policy choices tend to be
formulated and pursued. The authors do acknowledge that, in rational choice
theory, “rationality is primarily an attribute of individuals, and even then

24. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY: SERVANT OR MASTER? 22 (1973)
(viewing bureaucrats as self-interested utility maximizers, motivated by such factors as “salary,
perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, . . . and ease of managing the
bureau”).
25. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 6.
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only as an approximation,”26 and they recognize doubts about whether
“collectivities can have coherent preferences.”27 But again, they brush the
objection aside in one sentence: “[W]hen states exist, people have adopted
institutions that ensure that governments choose generally consistent policies
over time—policies that at a broad level can be said to reflect the state’s
interest as we understand the term.”28 Notice the fudge words here:
“generally consistent,” “over time,” “at a broad level,” “can be said to reflect
the state’s interest.” This obfuscation conceals a circularity of logic.
Goldsmith and Posner are attempting to show that states pursue policies to
further their interests, but here they are defining interests in terms of the
policies pursued.
Under this approach, we need only study what
governments do and work backwards, assuming that such acts must have
been in furtherance of interests we can discover after the fact.
In the end, Goldsmith and Posner appear to use purely instrumental
justifications for sloughing off nearly all criticisms about their assumptions.
They write that just as “[e]conomic theory has produced valuable insights
based on its simplifying assumptions,” so too their theory “should be judged
not on the ontological accuracy of its methodological assumptions, but on the
extent to which it sheds light on problems of international law.”29 The
problem with this response, of course, is that if the theory’s ontological
assumptions are false—for example, if conceptions of interests do indeed
reflect in part prevailing legal norms and cognitive categories, and if states
are collections of competing players, some of whom can be empowered by
international law to pursue certain interests over others—then the theory, as
elegant as it might be, is not explaining how the real world operates. Just as
assuming a can opener won’t help open a real can in a real forest, neither can
a set of incorrect assumptions about both human and state behavior be used
to satisfactorily explain such state behavior in real life.
I have spent a seemingly disproportionate amount of time on the
assumptions underlying The Limits of International Law because in the end
nearly all of the analytical action is concealed within those assumptions.
Once one adopts the book’s premises, then the rest of the authors’
argument—that state behavior is unconstrained by international law and is
therefore best analyzed as a series of strategic games—becomes both obvious
and obviously correct. If State A has a unitary interest in, say, maintaining its
sovereign border, and if that interest precedes and is completely uninfluenced
by international law norms about boundary disputes and any relevant limits
on the prerogatives of sovereign states, then the question of whether State A
attacks neighboring State B may indeed be determined based on game theory.
The assumptions, therefore, are a crucial predicate to all that follows. Then,

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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in the remainder of the book Goldsmith and Posner identify four possible
game theoretic scenarios for interstate interaction—(1) coincidence of
interest, (2) coordination, (3) cooperation, and (4) coercion—which they then
use to explain nearly all interstate relations. Below I briefly summarize these
scenarios.
According to Goldsmith and Posner, coincidence of interest occurs if,
for example, neither of two states has any interest in encroaching on the
other’s territory.30 Significantly, in the authors’ vision, the state’s interest
cannot be influenced by a sense of obedience to international law norms or
even by a sense of right behavior toward the other state. It must instead be
the result of each state deciding independently that it is not in its interest to
encroach, “without any regard to the action of the other state.”31 As a result,
the border is left in place because neither state wants what the other has.
In contrast, a coordination game takes place if two states settle on a
border and then respect the integrity of that border not because they are
uninterested in seizing territory within the borders of the other, but because
they believe that it is in their long-term interests to exist in a world in which
borders are respected.32 Goldsmith and Posner liken this to the rule that
everyone drive on the right (or left) side of the street.33 Without such an
agreed-upon norm of behavior, chaos would ensue. Thus, coordination is
distinguished from coincidence of interest because states restrain themselves
in order to gain long-term benefits.
Closely related to (and in many cases indistinguishable from)
coordination is cooperation. The authors identify cooperation as a kind of
mutually assured destruction.34 States refrain from encroaching based on
mutual threats of retaliation. The fact that Goldsmith and Posner call such a
system of mutual threats “cooperation” tells one quite a bit about their view
of international relations. In any event, as with coordination, “states
reciprocally refrain from activities . . . that would otherwise be in their
immediate self-interest in order to reap larger medium- or long-term
benefits.”35
Finally, Goldsmith and Posner identify coercion. Here, the more
powerful of the two states simply invades and establishes a new boundary or,
more commonly, pressures a weaker state to accede to the policy wishes of
the more powerful state. Thus, “[c]oercion results when a powerful state . . .
forces weaker states to engage in acts that are contrary to their interests.”36

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Goldsmith and Posner then attempt to explain relations between states
using this framework. Essentially, they argue that states may use
international legal norms as part of one of these games, but in those instances
international law is merely a product of state interests, not a constraint upon
them. According to the authors, “[i]nternational law emerges from states’
pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage. . . . It is not a
check on state self-interest; it is a product of state self-interest.”37 This is not
to say that they think international law is irrelevant; to the contrary, they
suggest that states can employ various international regimes to further their
interests. For example, treaties “can play an important role in helping states
achieve mutually beneficial outcomes by clarifying what counts as
cooperation or coordination in interstate interactions.”38 But the bottom line
for Goldsmith and Posner is that international law does not pull states into
compliance contrary to their interests, and therefore international law will
never have an independent valence. International law, they write, is always
“limited by the configurations of state interests and the distribution of state
power.”39
This is all well and good as far as it goes. Indeed, nearly everyone
would agree that states pursue some conception of interests internationally
and that if those interests are powerful enough, they may trump contrary
international law norms.
Similarly, there can be little doubt that
economically and militarily powerful states have fewer constraints on their
actions than others and so may be more able to violate international legal
norms. To believe in international law as an independent force in
international relations emphatically does not require that we jettison the idea
of power or somehow assume that states will not act in a self-interested way.
Thus, the four forms of interstate interaction identified by Goldsmith and
Posner surely describe many encounters among states. Indeed, the fact that
states rely on coincidence of interest, coordination, cooperation, and coercion
to order international relations is sufficiently obvious that it is not entirely
clear why they are worthy of such detailed categorization and explication.
Accordingly, nearly all international law scholars are likely to accept
that states are not always (or even often) altruistic, that power matters in
international relations, and that states use various degrees of cooperation and
coercion in their interactions with each other. But it is a large leap from
these rather uncontroversial propositions to the conclusion that Goldsmith
and Posner reach: that international law has no independent constraining
force. It is not surprising, of course, that Goldsmith and Posner would reach
this conclusion because, as discussed above, they start from an
extraordinarily limited vision of how international law might operate. They
seem to be capable of conceiving of international law in two ways only:
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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either as a purely external coercive force (picture an international police
force hauling a state off to jail for violating international law norms) or as a
non-force that is merely a mechanism for states to pursue pre-existing
interests.
Given those two choices, most scholars would view the second as more
accurate. But an analytical framework that can conceive only of those two
choices is one that is already impoverished. The assumptions with which
Goldsmith and Posner begin—that states are unitary rational actors pursuing
pre-existing interests—guarantee that they will omit from their framework all
of the ways in which international law is most likely to have significant
impact. Accordingly, they do not consider the possibility that state actors,
while pursuing their various cooperation and coercion games, are influenced
by norms of international law that they have imbibed to such a degree that
they have internalized them as their own. Nor does the book contemplate the
complex ways in which various state and non-state actors might deploy the
rhetorically persuasive power of international law to influence the way that
states play these games. Thus, Goldsmith and Posner have first constructed a
straw man version of international law—a lumbering positivist enforcer of
international moral discipline—that almost no one believes exists and then
dispatched this straw man to the dust bin while suggesting that they have
therefore said something meaningful about the limits of international law.
The remainder of the book then attempts to “demonstrate” the limits of
international law by looking at specific examples of state behavior. In
particular, Goldsmith and Posner examine customary international law and
essentially conclude that there is no such thing. Rather, they point to
instances when states have not followed the so-called universal norms of
customary law and suggest that the actual patterns of state behavior reflect
the various bilateral games discussed above rather than obedience to
customary international legal principles. Then they examine treaties, which
they suggest are more effective than customary international law norms
because treaties provide a forum to negotiate and establish what will count as
coordination and cooperation among states. In addition, the various
institutions associated with the ratification and monitoring of these treaties
provide information that can contribute to this coordination and cooperation.
Yet, even with regard to treaties, they argue against the idea that such
treaties have any normative force, outside of the willingness of states to back
such treaties with coercive force. Thus, for example, Goldsmith and Posner
acknowledge that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has had some success in trying war criminals, including
Slobodan Milosevic,40 but they argue that “it was not the gravitational pull of
the ICTY charter that lured these defendants to The Hague. Rather, it was
NATO’s (and primarily American) military, diplomatic, and financial

40. Id. at 116.
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might.”41 However, to the extent that part of the reason for the mobilization
of this military, diplomatic, and financial might was the perception that
Milosevic’s regime was violating international law, then it is difficult to see
how this is an argument against international law’s force. Indeed, Goldsmith
and Posner state that the United States has consistently threatened to
withhold foreign aid to the successor regimes in the Balkans unless they turn
over war criminals to the ICTY.42 But while they seem to view this fact as
evidence that international law has no effect,43 it seems to me to prove just
the opposite. Of course the mere creation of the ICTY by itself did not
automatically cause war criminals to be sent there. And I suppose in the
positivist world Goldsmith and Posner construct that means the Genocide
Convention and the ICTY statute had no impact.44 But it seems clear that
international law at the very least affected the willingness of the United
States to pursue the policies it did, which is a very significant impact. And
that is not even counting the impact the ICTY may have had in Bosnia itself,
strengthening the hands of the anti-Milosevic forces and helping to turn
popular opinion against him. The trouble is that Goldsmith and Posner leave
out the fact that the very existence of a treaty (or any international law norm)
changes the bargaining power of both the states involved and the various
actors within states who are trying to gain the upper hand in internal policy
debates.
To be sure, Goldsmith and Posner argue that the existence of the treaty
is not really what causes a state to engage in coercive action. Thus, they note
that the U.S. intervened in the Balkans, where it had a strategic interest, but
not in Africa, where it lacks strong strategic interests, or Saudi Arabia,
China, or Russia, where its strategic interests conflict with insisting on
compliance with human rights treaties.45 But this only shows that a treaty (or
any international law norm) is generally not the sole determining factor in
weighing state action. And again, this is an argument against a straw man
because no serious scholar has suggested that international law is
automatically enforced regardless of other strategic factors. And of course
sometimes (and shamefully) these other strategic interests will outweigh the
imperative to enforce international law norms. But that is not the point. The
real questions are these: (1) did the existence of flagrant human rights
violations in the Balkans provide any type of impetus for NATO intervention
(over and above any other strategic interests); and (2) did the existence of
these human rights norms and the ICTY itself ultimately change the internal
political dynamic within Bosnia? If the answer to both of those questions is

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 115–16.
Id. at 111, 116.
Id. at 117.
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yes, and I think it is, then it is difficult to maintain the idea that international
law is not having an important effect.
Thus, the authors’ true normative intentions are unmasked. So long as
policymakers, bureaucrats, and the general populace of a state believe that
international law is important, there can be little doubt that such a belief
system will have a real impact on state decisionmaking. As a result, the only
way for the book’s thesis about the limits of international law to become true
is if enough people can first be persuaded that international law is
unimportant. Goldsmith and Posner are certainly entitled to make this
normative argument. But such an argument should not be buried within a
supposedly descriptive account of how international law actually operates.
Finally, Goldsmith and Posner reject three supposed challenges to their
theory. First, they argue that just because states frequently use the rhetoric of
international law does not mean that they are actually motivated by a desire
to comply with it.46 Yet, though this is obviously true, it does not therefore
mean that the rhetoric has no persuasive power over time. Second, they
resist any suggestion that states have a moral obligation to comply with
international law.47 Instead, they contend that, unlike domestic law,
international law cannot rely on theories of consent or democratic
participation to justify obedience.48 Moreover, international law has no
independent enforcement agent. Yet, again they ignore the possibility that
norms gain moral power through means other than positivist enforcers or
democratic participation. And they fail to see that international law norms
are part of a “world constitutive process” of norm contestation and
development.49 Thus, if a norm attracts enough adherents over time, it
acquires a moral force because, as a sociological and psychological matter,
people, including policymakers, view it as such. As a result, to say that there
is no moral obligation to comply with international law is, as noted above,
simply a normative argument that states should not pay attention to such
norms. Third, Goldsmith and Posner argue against what they call
“cosmopolitan theory” which supposedly suggests that states have a duty to
act on the basis of global rather than state welfare.50 Yet, as discussed in Part
III, their account radically limits the scope of cosmopolitanism, which
potentially offers a more nuanced understanding of international legal

46. Id. at 165.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 191–93 (noting, for example, that when states enter treaties, the treaties bind a large
number of people to policies to which they did not consent and about which they have not had an
opportunity to exercise rights of democratic participation).
49. Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 253, 254–55 (1967) (referring to a process by which interactions among communities
create “reciprocal demands, expectations, identities, and operational patterns” which then lead to
“specialized institutional practices” that have real force in “sustaining stable contact, or restoring
severed relations”).
50. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 165–66.
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process—a far more nuanced understanding, in fact, than the one Goldsmith
and Posner themselves put forth.
II.

The Power of International Law

As discussed in Part I, Goldsmith and Posner deny that international law
has any independent power that would tend to pull a state toward compliance
in opposition to that state’s interests. But once we unpack the idea of a state
interest, we recognize that conceptions of proper policy do not simply arise
in a vacuum. Rather, they are developed by human beings operating with
various sets of assumptions, ideas about justice, conceptions of global
strategy, and beliefs about morality. These assumptions, ideas, and cognitive
categories are themselves shaped in part by what sociolegal scholars have
long termed legal consciousness.51 Thus, the legal norms that are “in the air”
at any given moment of history—including international law norms—may
well affect how both policy makers and ordinary citizens think about the
state’s interests. In addition, given that any state policy decision is inevitably
the result of a contest among various bureaucratic power centers, all of which
are themselves influenced by outside pressure groups, lobbyists, NGOs, and
the like, a more complex understanding of international law would need to
explore ways in which international legal norms empower specific interests
both within and without the state policy-making apparatus and provide
arguments and leverage that they might not otherwise have had.
Accordingly, this Part first applies scholarship on legal consciousness to
international law. Then, it examines the ways in which international legal
arguments are deployed by those seeking to influence state policy choices.
In both sections, I provide examples of how international law’s power
manifests in actual settings.
A. International Legal Consciousness
Goldsmith and Posner fall into the positivist trap of seeing law only as
that which coercively forces individuals (or states) to do things that they do
not want to do. Not surprisingly, their view de-emphasizes the efficacy of
international legal norms, except for treaties entered into by nation–states,
because such norms generally do not have coercive power to back them up.
But coercive power is not the only way that law can have an effect, either
domestically or internationally. Indeed, as Martha Finnemore has noted,
“[s]ocially constructed rules, principles, norms of behavior, and shared
beliefs may provide states, individuals, and other actors with understandings
of what is important or valuable and what are effective and/or legitimate
means of obtaining those valued goods.”52 As a result, law has an impact not

51. See infra subpart II(A).
52. FINNEMORE, supra note 13, at 15.
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merely (or perhaps even primarily) because it keeps us from doing what we
want. Rather, law changes what we want in the first place.
Yet, while constructivists have long made such arguments, they have
not drawn on the extensive domestic sociolegal scholarship on legal
consciousness. That is a shame because legal consciousness scholars have
sought to study empirically just how it is that legal categories become
reflected in ordinary discourse and thought. Indeed, such scholars have
argued that law operates as much by influencing modes of thought as by
determining conduct in any specific case.53 It is a constitutive part of culture,
shaping and determining social relations54 and providing “a distinctive
manner of imagining the real.”55
For example, “[l]ong before we ever think about going to a courtroom,
we encounter landlords and tenants, husbands and wives, barkeeps and hotel
guests—roles that already embed a variety of juridical notions.”56 Indeed,
we cannot escape the categories and discourses that law supplies.57 These
categories may include ideas of what is public and what is private, who is an
employer and who is an employee, what precautions are “reasonable,” who
has “rights,” and so on.58 In short, “it is just about impossible to describe any

53. See, e.g., KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY 30–32 (1988) (examining “the
role of legal ideology in structuring mass consciousness”); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY,
THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 45 (1998) (defining “legal
consciousness” and arguing that “every time a person interprets some event in terms of legal
concepts or terminology—whether to applaud or to criticize, whether to appropriate or to resist—
legality is produced” and “repeated invocation of the law sustains its capacity to comprise social
relations”); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF
LEGAL MOBILIZATION 7 (1994) (“Legal (or rights) consciousness . . . refers to the ongoing,
dynamic process of constructing one’s understanding of, and relationship to, the social world
through use of legal conventions and discourses.”); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND
GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 5 (1990) (arguing
that “[l]egal consciousness is expressed by the act of going to court as well as by talk about rights
and entitlements” and that such “[c]onsciousness develops through individual experiences”); Susan
S. Silbey, Making a Place for Cultural Analyses of Law, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 42 (1992)
(noting that “law contributes to the articulation of meanings and values of daily life”).
54. See, e.g., id. at 41 (arguing that “law is a part of the cultural processes that actively
contribute in the composition of social relations”).
55. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 173 (1983).
56. Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism? Cultural Analysis, Cultural
Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3, 20 (2001).
57. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 105 (1984) (“[I]n actual
historical societies, the law governing social relations—even when never invoked, alluded to, or
even consciously much thought about—has been such a key element in the constitution of
productive relations that it is difficult to see the value . . . of trying to describe those relations apart
from law.”).
58. Indeed, according to Sarat and Kearns:
Perhaps the most stunning example of law’s constitutive powers is the willingness of
persons to conceive of themselves as legal subjects, as the kind of beings the law
implies they are—and needs them to be. Legal subjects think of themselves as
competent, self-directing persons who, for example, enter bargained-for exchanges as
free and equal agents.
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set of ‘basic’ social practices without describing the legal relations among the
people involved—legal relations that don’t simply condition how the people
relate to each other but to an important extent define the constitutive terms of
the relationship . . . .”59
Because legal categories and ideas suffuse social life,60 scholars have
studied both how people think about the law and the ways in which largely
inchoate ideas about the law can affect decisions they make.61 Sally Engle
Merry observes legal consciousness in “the way people conceive of the
‘natural’ and normal way of doing things, their habitual patterns of talk and
action, and their commonsense understanding of the world.”62 These
understandings are often taken for granted.
This is because legal
consciousness may be so much a part of an individual’s worldview that it is
present even when law is seemingly absent from an understanding or
construction of life events.63 Thus, “[w]e are not merely the inert recipients
of law’s external pressures. Rather, we have imbibed law’s images and
meanings so that they seem our own.”64 Law is an often unnoticed, but
Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship and
Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 28 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993).
59. Gordon, supra note 57, at 103.
60. See Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New
Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 907 (1996)
(“Law and Society scholarship depicts the law as a culturally and structurally embedded social
institution.”).
61. Indeed, various authors have explored the legal consciousness of average citizens. See, e.g.,
BUMILLER, supra note 53; EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 53; MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS
IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); MCCANN, supra
note 53; MERRY, supra note 53; BARBARA YNGVESSON, VIRTUOUS CITIZENS, DISRUPTIVE
SUBJECTS: ORDER AND COMPLAINT IN A NEW ENGLAND COURT (1993); Patricia Ewick & Susan S.
Silbey, Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An Account of Legal Consciousness, 26 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 731 (1992); Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and
Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1055
(2000); Austin Sarat, “. . .The Law Is All Over”: Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness
of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990); Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner,
Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663
(1989).
62. MERRY, supra note 53, at 5; see also Gordon, supra note 57, at 101 (arguing that we should
“treat legal forms as ideologies and rituals whose ‘effects’—effects that include people’s ways of
sorting out social experience, giving it meaning, grading it as natural, just, and necessary or as
contrived, unjust and subject to alteration—are in the realm of consciousness”); Sarat & Simon,
supra note 56, at 19 (“Law is part of the everyday world, contributing powerfully to the apparently
‘stable, taken-for-granted quality of that world and to the generally shared sense that as things are,
so must they be.’”)(quoting Sarat & Kearns, supra note 58, at 30)).
63. See David M. Trubeck, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36
STAN. L. REV. 575, 604 (1984) (“Law, like other aspects of belief systems, helps to define the role
of an individual in society and the relations with others that make sense.”); see also JEAN
COMAROFF, BODY OF POWER, SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE: THE CULTURE AND HISTORY OF A SOUTH
AFRICAN PEOPLE 4–5 (1985) (arguing that consciousness is “embedded in the practical constitution
of everyday life, part and parcel of the process whereby the subject is constructed by external
sociocultural forms”).
64. Sarat & Kearns, supra note 58, at 29. See also Gordon, supra note 57, at 109 (“[T]he power
exerted by a legal regime consists less in the force that it can bring to bear against violators of its

2006]

Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law

1283

nevertheless crucial, presence in our ideas of what is fair, appropriate, or
natural.65
This focus on law in everyday life66 recognizes that people interpret
their experiences by drawing on a collaboration of law and other social
structures.67 These interpretations may be widely varied and will, of course,
depend partly on social class, prior contacts with the law, and political
standing.68
Nevertheless, legal consciousness constitutes an ongoing
interaction between official norms as embodied in the common sense
categories of daily life and each individual’s ongoing participation in the
process of constructing legality.69 Accordingly, legal consciousness includes
the ways in which individuals themselves deploy, transform, or subvert
official legal understandings and thereby “construct” law on the ground.70

rules than in its capacity to persuade people that the world described in its images and categories is
the only attainable world in which a sane person would want to live.”).
65. See Gordon, supra note 57, at 111 (“In short, the legal forms we use set limits on what we
can imagine as practical options: Our desires and plans tend to be shaped out of the limited stock of
forms available to us: The forms thus condition not just our power to get what we want but what we
want (or think we can get) itself.”). Indeed, scholars have noted that people’s judgments about
praise and blame will often match the corresponding legal categories, even when those people are
not familiar in detail with legal rules and doctrines. See generally THE ALLOCATION OF
RESPONSIBILITY 109, 155–58 (Max Gluckman ed., 1972) (collecting essays by multiple authors
analyzing similarities between industrialized societies and primitive African tribes in terms of their
legal systems and behavioral patterns).
66. See, e.g., LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993).
67. David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Rights, Remembrance, and the Reconciliation of
Difference, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 14 (1996) (asserting that their “study points to the mutuality
and inseparability of law, culture, identity and experience” and that “[l]aw is one of the elements
that constitute the categories and routines of everyday life”); Sarat, supra note 61, at 346 (arguing
that welfare recipients, for example, “use legal ideas to interpret and make sense of their
relationship to the welfare bureaucracy even as they refine those ideas by making claims the
meaning and moral content of which are often at variance with dominant understandings”).
68. See, e.g., Davina Cooper, Local Government Legal Consciousness in the Shadow of
Juridification, 22 J. L. & SOC’Y 506, 510 (1995) (“[L]aw is understood experientially, in ways
shaped by class, education, geography, and occupational positioning.”); Carroll Seron & Frank
Munger, Law and Inequality: Race, Gender . . . and, of Course, Class, 22 ANN. REV. SOC. 187, 202
(1996) (asserting that “[t]he relationship between lawyers and the evolution of . . . the class
system[] should be a prime area for continuing development of theory and research”).
69. “Legality” is defined as those meanings, sources of authority, and cultural practices that are
in some sense legal although not necessarily approved or acknowledged by official law. The
concept of legality offers the opportunity to consider “how, where and with what effect law is
produced in and through commonplace social interactions . . . . How do our social roles and
statuses, our relationships, our obligations, prerogatives, and responsibilities, our identities, and our
behaviors bear the imprint of law?” EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 53, at 20. See also Sarat &
Kearns, supra note 58, at 55. (“Law is continuously shaped and reshaped by the ways it is used,
even as law’s constitutive power constrains patterns of usage.”).
70. See, e.g., Austin D. Sarat, Redirecting Legal Scholarship in Law Schools, 12 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 129, 140 (2000) (reviewing PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (1999))
(“Contests over meaning in courts or communities . . . become occasions for [sociolegal scholars to
observe] the play of power. Meanings that seem natural, or taken-for-granted, are described as
hegemonic, but because the construction of meaning through law is, in fact, typically contested,
scholars show the many ways in which resistance occurs.”) (citation omitted). For discussions of
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We all take part in the construction of legal consciousness, even as we are
also inevitably affected by the legal categories of the social structures around
us.
Although a detailed discussion of the legal consciousness literature is
beyond the scope of this Book Review Essay, it seems clear that when
Goldsmith and Posner complain that the international law constructivist
literature lacks “a mechanism for how moral and legal talk influences
national behavior,”71 legal consciousness scholarship provides part of an
answer. And while it is difficult to definitively prove a direct causal link
between a legal conception and an individual’s category of thought, that does
not mean that such processes are not very powerful determinants of how we
think.
Ironically, in another context Jack Goldsmith himself appears to have
acknowledged the importance of changes in legal consciousness. In an
article cowritten with Cass Sunstein, Goldsmith notes that the recent creation
of military commissions to try alleged terrorists engendered a storm of
protest even though President Roosevelt’s similar decision to create a
military commission during World War II was widely praised.72 The authors
take up the task of trying to explain this difference in response. In the end,
they suggest that one of the most important changes from World War II to
today is “a massively strengthened commitment to individual rights, not only
within the culture but within the legal system itself.”73 For example, they
note that in 1942 the country was much less libertarian in its outlook:
[R]estrictions on free speech did not produce a firestorm of public
protest.
Libelous speech was commonly regulated, without
discernible public objection. . . . [P]ublic opposition to discrimination
was far more tepid than it is today. Nor did the public insist on what
we now take to be minimal procedural safeguards for the accused.74
Goldsmith and Sunstein do not delve into the question of what caused these
shifts in social attitudes,75 but it seems quite clear that changes in the
framework of constitutional law had something to do with it. And we need
not engage in unsolvable conundrums such as whether changes in attitudes
lead to changes in law or vice versa to recognize that, at the very least, the
changes in law reinforce shifts in societal perceptions, even among those
who are not consciously aware of the actual legal doctrines they have
imbibed. Thus, as discussed in more detail below, ordinary people are far

these forms of resistance, see EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 53; Ewick & Silbey, supra note 61;
MERRY, supra note 53; Yngvesson, supra note 61.
71. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 171.
72. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 261–62 (2002).
73. Id. at 282.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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more likely to frame their claims in rights terms after the so-called rights
revolution of the Warren and Burger Court eras, than they would have in
earlier periods of American history.
Although Goldsmith and Sunstein acknowledge changes in domestic
law during the sixty years from Roosevelt’s military commissions to today,
they do not focus on the parallel “rights revolution” in international law.
Since World War II, we have seen the large-scale development of
international human rights treaties, conventions, declarations, courts, and
institutions, along with their related monitoring bodies, NGO watchdog
groups, and cause lawyers. While it is unclear, as Goldsmith and Sunstein
point out, whether the military commissions are actually illegal under
international law,76 the crucial point is that all of this international norm
development (along with the concurrent—and obviously related—rise in
rights talk under the U.S. Constitution) is likely to have affected perceptions
and intuitions about the propriety and wisdom of creating military
commissions today. Likewise, it is striking that even the Bush administration
was forced to pay lip service to the United Nations during the run-up to the
invasion of Iraq, if only because U.S. popular opinion demanded it.77 Indeed,
various polls taken in February and March 2003 indicated that a sizable
majority of Americans wanted the U.S. to work through the U.N.78 This too
is undoubtedly, in part, the result of changes in legal consciousness over the
past sixty years about international legal institutions and international
processes.
Other domestic examples help suggest ways in which legal norms
change consciousness over time, even when the literal enforcement of the
legal norm is lacking. Perhaps the most famous such instance is the U.S.
Supreme Court’s declaration in Brown v. Board of Education79 that racially
segregated schools were inherently unequal. This declaration had enormous

76. See id. at 277–78 (describing the “possible illegality” of the Bush order).
77. See Ron Hutcheson, Bush Acts to Rally the Nation for Iraq War, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Mar. 3, 2003, at A5 (noting that while Bush repeatedly said that he was prepared to go to war with
or without U.N. backing, public approval for such a war turned to opposition “if the United States
ha[d] to act without U.N. support” and that “[d]espite Bush’s public disdain for polls, he and his
advisers are keeping close watch on the national mood in the final countdown to war”).
78. For example, one survey from February 2003 indicated that nearly 65% of Americans
believed that it was at least “desirable” for the U.S. to get a fresh mandate from the United Nations
before launching military action in Iraq. See Editorial, Behind Bush & Blair, INVESTOR’S BUS.
DAILY, Feb. 24, 2003, at A18 (commenting on a recent IBD/TIPP Poll and observing that “34% [of
Americans] insist on a U.N. mandate before we can go [into Iraq] and another 29% say that would
be desirable, though not essential”). Likewise, 62% of those surveyed in a Los Angeles Times poll
“said they would back a war effort endorsed by the U.N. Security Council” with only 55%
supporting a “military action with some allied backing, but without U.N. concurrence.” Mark Z.
Barabak, Showdown with Iraq; The Times Poll, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, at A1. Even as late as
March 13–16, 54% of Americans believed that the United States should first get a U.N. resolution
to use force before attacking Iraq. THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AMERICA’S IMAGE FURTHER
ERODES, EUROPEANS WANT WEAKER TIES 7 (2003), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/175.pdf.
79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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importance as a statement of an assimilationist ideal, even though legally
enforced segregation persisted for many years,80 and de facto segregation still
exists today.81 Of course, some may justly believe that the mere statement of
a norm is woefully insufficient when true enforcement is necessary, but that
does not mean that the normative statements are not independently
important.82 Indeed, as Jeremy Waldron points out, Brown’s “archetypal
power is staggering: In the years since 1954 it has become an icon of the
law’s commitment to demolish the structures of de jure (and perhaps also de
facto) segregation and to pursue and discredit forms of discrimination and
badges of racial inferiority wherever they crop up in American law or public
administration.”83 As one African-American man, serving in the Marines at
the time, has stated:
On this momentous night of May 17, 1954, I felt that at last the
government was willing to assert itself on behalf of first-class
citizenship, even for Negroes. I experienced a sense of loyalty that
I had never felt before. I was sure that this was the beginning of a
new era of American democracy.84
Even though the federal government’s commitment to ending segregation
lagged over the next ten years,85 the sentiments expressed by this man
indicate the psychological effects of even a legal statement that is not
enforced.
Moreover, while it is, of course, “impossible to gauge the specific
consequences of any given court decision, given that such decisions occur

80. See PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 109–10 (1988) (“The Supreme
Court’s refusal to set deadlines for desegregation invited Southern officials to invent foot-dragging
tactics, and frustrated the NAACP lawyers who had struggled for years with cautious and often
hostile federal judges, most of them closely tied to [the] local power structures.”).
81. See generally, e.g., Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between
Residential Segregation and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795 (1996) (arguing that school
segregation remains high in large part because of high degrees of residential segregation).
82. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111 (1977) (distinguishing between
the “enactment force” and the “gravitational force” of precedents).
83. See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1725 (2005); see also Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE
AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 3, 3–4 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (noting
Brown’s enduring iconic power in contemporary American culture and politics); Christopher E.
Smith, Law and Symbolism, 1997 DET. C. L. REV. 935, 938 (“Although actual implementation of
school desegregation took many years, the Supreme Court’s decision [in Brown] constituted an
important symbolic statement that could call attention to injustice, confer legitimacy upon civil
rights activists, and encourage political mobilization against discrimination.”).
84. THE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER 36 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 1991).
85. See Sheryll D. Cashin, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Coalition Politics, 49 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1029, 1033–34 (2005) (“In the ten years between the Supreme Court’s announcement of the
Brown decision . . . and the passage of the [Civil Rights Act of 1964], virtually no progress was
made in school desegregation.”).
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within a larger social context,”86 Brown generated optimism within activists
in the civil rights movement and helped provide them with an additional
platform.87 As one commenter has noted, “[o]ne of the major consequences
of the Brown decision was that it was a catalyst for hope and mobilization,
rousing the most vigorous and sustained movement for change ever mounted
in the United States.”88 Indeed, in the ten years following Brown, civil rights
activity was extraordinary, culminating in the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.89 And while it is possible to debate the degree to which legal
decisions such as Brown reflect societal change or help cause such change,
there can be little doubt that Brown was, at the very least, an inspiration to
other mobilizing groups, such as women, homosexuals, the elderly, and the
disabled.90
Finally, the change in racial attitudes—at least as expressed in opinion
polls—since Brown is extraordinary. In 1954, when the case was decided,
55% of Americans approved of the decision and 40% disapproved.91 Forty
years later, 87% approved and 11% disapproved.92 Likewise, in 1942, 68%
of the American public supported racially segregated schools; by 1985 that
number had dropped to 7%.93 And the decades since Brown have brought an
American consensus in favor of equal access to jobs not only for African
Americans but for all groups.94 As one sociologist has observed, these
changes have been “large, steady, and sweeping.”95 Of course, such changes
have not eradicated racism (though they may have pushed it underground),
nor are they all directly attributable to Brown, but it seems clear that,
whatever the combination of causes, there has been a shift in legal
consciousness since the Brown decision.

86. Margaret L. Andersen, From Brown to Grutter: The Diverse Beneficiaries of Brown v.
Board of Education, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1073, 1079.
87. Id. at 1079 (“Perhaps the most immediate consequence of the Brown decision was the
optimism it generated, and the platform it created, for the mobilization of the Civil Rights
Movement.”).
88. Id. at 1081. But see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 11 (1994) (finding little evidence of this effect and suggesting that
Brown was a catalyst for the Civil Rights Act only because the decision pushed white southerners so
far to the right that it provoked a national backlash).
89. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
90. Andersen, supra note 86, at 1081.
91. Julie Ray, Reflections on the “Trouble in Little Rock,” Part II, GALLUP POLL TUESDAY
BRIEFING, Mar. 4, 2003, at 71.
92. Id. at 72.
93. Lawrence D. Bobo, The Color Line, the Dilemma, and the Dream: Race Relations in
America at the Close of the Twentieth Century, in CIVIL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WRONGS: BLACKWHITE RELATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 31, 36 (John Higham ed., 1997).
94. See Daniel Yankelovich, How Changes in the Economy Are Reshaping American Values, in
VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 16, 31–32 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1994) (“Unlike the America of
the 1930s, the American public today accepts a pluralistic society in which women and minorities
have access to equal opportunities with white males.”).
95. Bobo, supra note 93, at 38.
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Similar changes can be seen elsewhere in domestic law. For example,
prior to the enactment of laws protecting battered women, acts of domestic
violence such as marital rape had not been viewed as serious social problems,
let alone crimes.96
Efforts to criminalize such behavior therefore
symbolically indicated that the criminal justice system was beginning to take
violence against women seriously.97 Most importantly, wife abuse was
moved out of the private sphere and into public awareness. Indeed, the mere
idea that spousal abuse might actually be a crime rather than a private dispute
is a significant change. Thus, the criminal justice system now incorporates,
at least to some extent, feminist ideas about domestic violence into its
standard understanding of violence between males and females.
Likewise, sexual harassment law has brought about large attitudinal
shifts that go far beyond the literal legal requirements. For example,
corporations responding to the threat of Title VII have introduced major
institutional changes that have altered many aspects of workplace culture.98
At the same time, male–female relations in the workplace now reflect
internalized norms against sexual harassment.99 One can dispute whether the
impacts have been good or bad, but it is difficult to deny them altogether.
And while feminists and religious conservatives may debate the wisdom of
the no-fault divorce revolution,100 neither side seriously disputes that the

96. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF
BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 157–69 (1982) (chronicling difficulties women faced in
convincing police to make arrests or in convincing courts to provide remedies in domestic violence
cases). Indeed, for many years rape laws featured an exception that made it impossible for a
husband to rape his wife. See, e.g., Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 223 (Ga. 1985) (discussing
common law theory that a husband could not be held criminally liable for raping his wife).
97. See Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to “Straighten Out” Criminal Law:
What Might Happen when Queer Theory and Practice Meet Criminal Law’s Conventional
Responses to Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 81, 84 (2003) (arguing that
“interventions such as arrest, prosecution and treatment” symbolically indicated “that the system
was beginning to take violence against women seriously”).
98. As Susan Sturm has noted:
Proactive lawyers (some plaintiffs’, some management’s) are spearheading the
redesign of employment systems in companies concerned about the adequacy and legal
vulnerability of their workplace practices. Civil rights-oriented lawyers are serving
stints in newly-designed positions within companies that have embarked on major
change initiatives. Workplace advocacy organizations are experimenting with
interesting combinations of law, policy, organization, community development,
training, and institutional redesign.
Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 277, 278.
99. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2064 (2003) (arguing that
“sexual harassment law, as envisioned by some feminist reformers and implemented by many
human resource (HR) managers, has become an important justification for a neo-Taylorist project of
suppressing sexuality and intimacy in the workplace”).
100. Compare Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 75, 86 (2004) (arguing that “the availability of free exit through no-fault divorce” is “a
bedrock liberal value” that “stands for the right to withdraw or refuse to engage; it is the ability to
dissociate, to cut oneself out of a relationship with other persons”), with Katherine Shaw Spaht,
Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Future of Marriage in the Law, 49 LOY. L. REV. 1, 9
THE
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change in divorce laws has helped alter cultural attitudes about marriage and
divorce over the past three decades.
It is true, as mentioned previously, that these various changes cannot
ever be traced solely to changes in legal norms. Indeed, in all of these cases,
the legal changes occurred alongside social and political changes, and
disentangling which caused which would be an impossible (and fruitless)
effort. Moreover, there are also instances when changes in law do not appear
to have affected either actions or attitudes on the ground. Perhaps most
famously, Stewart Macaulay’s study of contractual relations seems to
indicate that changes in contract law doctrine had no impact on the form
contracts used all the time by repeat players in the manufacturing sector, who
relied on more informal sanctions to encourage contract compliance and who
never envisioned going to court over a contract dispute in any event.101
Because of these sorts of limitations, constructivism has sometimes
been criticized for lacking analytical rigor, and it has not been very
successful in developing a framework that would allow one to predict in
advance when a legal regime is likely to shape attitudes, interests, and
consciousness, and when it is not.102 Indeed, Goldsmith and Posner would
likely argue that the inability to predict when international law will affect
state decisions and when it will not renders it useless as a tool for discussing
international relations.
Yet there is no reason to sacrifice a richer understanding of empirical
phenomena just because one wants the supposed clarity of a distortingly
simplified framework. The mere fact that changes in legal consciousness are
difficult to quantify and predict does not render them any less important in
analyzing state behavior concerning international law. Indeed, there are
simply too many instances when we do see state actors internalize the norms
of international law to dismiss them as flukes or explain them away as mere
strategic behavior. Perhaps the best-known example of a change in
international legal consciousness concerns the very idea of crimes against
humanity. At the time of the Nuremberg prosecutions, it was not at all clear
that the pre-war atrocities committed by the German government against
German citizens constituted an international crime punishable outside
Germany itself.103 Yet, the statute of the Nuremberg tribunal and the

(2003) (“The repeal of the law of legal separation and the substitution of the procurement of divorce
with relative ease affected the stability of marriage, not only as to its duration, but also as to its
quality.”).
101. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).
102. See Ruggie, supra note 13, at 883 (acknowledging that constructivism “remains relatively
poor at specifying its own scope conditions, the contexts within which its explanatory features can
be expected to take effect”).
103. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Punish Human Rights Violations
of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2555 (1991) (“To the extent that they reached Nazi offenses
against German nationals, the Nuremberg prosecutions represented a radical innovation in
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decisions of the tribunal itself effectively established such a crime.104 Then,
subsequent to Nuremberg, almost every state for the first time voluntarily
subjected itself to the Genocide Convention,105 further enshrining the idea
that individuals might have international rights against their own nation–
states. Today, this idea is sufficiently well accepted that we commonly see
international prosecutions for crimes against humanity committed within
state borders,106 and the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over
such crimes.107 Significantly, though the U.S. has not ratified the
International Criminal Court statute,108 the basic idea of a crime against

international law. With few and limited exceptions, international law had not previously addressed
a state’s treatment of its own citizens, much less imposed criminal sanctions for such conduct.”).
104. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, Art. 6(c) (establishing individual responsibility for crimes against humanity
committed “before or during the war”) (emphasis added); International Military Tribunal, Opinion
& Judgment, The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judlawre.htm. At the time, this issue raised serious
retroactivity concerns precisely because the statute was effectively establishing a new international
crime. Accordingly, the Tribunal finessed this issue, interpreting the statute to give the Tribunal
jurisdiction over only those crimes against humanity that were deemed sufficiently related to the
other two crimes in the statute: crimes against peace and war crimes. See id. (“To constitute crimes
against humanity, the acts relied on before the outbreak of war must have been in execution of, or in
connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”).
105. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. 2, S. Exec. Doc. O, 81-1, at 7 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280. For a list of ratifying
countries, see http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/1.htm.
106. See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 837, 841–42 (2005) (considering the work of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and noting that war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide “have been made subject to international jurisdiction, although some were committed
domestically, reflecting radical developments in the construction of international criminal
jurisdiction”).
107. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999.
108. See http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html (listing ratification
history of the statute).
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humanity under international law is no longer seriously in doubt,109
signifying an important shift from World War II to the present day.110
In addition, there is evidence that even military officers, who might be
supposed to resist any limits on their strategic behavior, may come to imbibe
and espouse international norms. For example, in the U.S. military, every
proposed bombing target is vetted by lawyers who work to ensure that the
minimum possible collateral damage is created, in accordance with
international law.111 Likewise, military lawyers and current and former
military officers have been among the loudest opponents of the Bush
administration’s lack of concern for abiding by the Geneva Conventions in
detaining and interrogating terrorism suspects.112 These acts are not

109. For example, the U.S. supported the creation of the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia), see Wayne Sandholtz, The Iraqi National Museum and International
Law: A Duty to Protect, 44 COLUM. J. INT’L L. 185, 204 (2005) (“The United States supported the
creation of the ICTY and has contributed to its work, not least by providing experienced
investigators and prosecutors to the ICTY Office of The Prosecutor.”), whose enabling statute
included crimes against humanity in its jurisdictional reach. Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 5, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192, 1193–94. In addition,
U.S. courts have regularly recognized crimes against humanity as a violation of the Law of Nations
that is cognizable under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See, e.g., Beth Stephens,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 533, 537 & n.18 (2004) (noting U.S. cases interpreting the ATCA that have
“recognized a small core of actionable human rights violations in addition to torture, including
summary execution, disappearance, war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery, and arbitrary
detention” ) (emphasis added).
110. See, e.g., David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 86
(2004) (“The phrase ‘crimes against humanity’ has acquired enormous resonance in the legal and
moral imaginations of the post-World War II world.”).
111. SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 13-1AOC, VOL. 3 § 8.4 (2005),
available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/13/afi13-1aocv3/afi13-1aocv3.pdf.
112. For example, in six memoranda dated from February 5 to March 13, 2003, the Air Force,
Army, Navy, and Marine Offices of the Judge Advocate General protested “extreme” interrogation
techniques being permitted in the so-called war against terrorism. Memorandum from Jack L.
Rives, Major Gen., U.S. Air Force, Deputy Judge Advocate Gen., to Air Force Gen. Counsel (Feb.
5, 2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf; Memorandum from Jack L. Rives,
Major Gen., U.S. Air Force, Deputy Judge Advocate Gen., to Air Force Gen. Counsel (Feb. 6,
2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf; Memorandum from Michael F. Lohr,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Judge Advocate Gen., to Air Force Gen. Counsel (Feb. 6, 2003),
available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf; Memorandum from Kevin M. Sandkuhler,
Brigadier Gen., U.S. Marine Corps, Staff Judge Advocate to Commandant of the Marine Corps, to
Air Force Gen. Counsel (Feb. 27, 2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf;
Memorandum from Thomas J. Romig, Major Gen., U.S. Army, Judge Advocate Gen., to Air Force
Gen. Counsel (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf; Memorandum
from Michael F. Lohr, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Judge Advocate Gen., to Air Force Gen. Counsel
(Mar. 13, 2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf. As Air Force Major
General Jack Rives wrote in one of the memoranda:
[T]he use of the more extreme interrogation techniques simply is not how the U.S.
armed forces have operated in recent history. We have taken the legal and moral
“high-road” in the conduct of our military operations regardless of how others may
operate. Our forces are trained in this legal and moral mindset beginning the day they
enter active duty. It should be noted that law of armed conflict and code of conduct
training have been mandated by Congress and emphasized since the Viet Nam conflict
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explainable simply by suggesting that this is a “cooperation game” where
military officers wish to obey international law solely to ensure that U.S.
targets or captured soldiers in the future are treated similarly. Instead, it
seems clear that these officials have internalized the values of international
law and see them as part of what is required, both morally and strategically.
Similarly, in the environmental context, we have seen multinational
corporations supporting the Kyoto protocol on global climate change,113
either because they want to take part in the growing international trade in
pollution credits,114 or because they seek future profits from investments in
renewable energy.115 Such activities suggest that corporations, through the
mechanism of capitalist self-interest, have come to internalize (and seek
profit from) an international environmental norm. Further, such norm
internalization by nongovernmental entities can in turn influence
governmental actors.
Finally, obedience to international legal norms, even if sometimes
detrimental to state interests in the short term—because one is restrained
from taking certain actions—may further state interests in the longer term by
allowing the state to have legitimacy and a certain morally persuasive voice
in the eyes of other states. Indeed, it is significant that Goldsmith and Posner
almost entirely exclude so-called “soft law”116 or “soft power”117 from their

when our POWs were subjected to torture by their captors. We need to consider the
overall impact of approving extreme interrogation techniques as giving official
approval and legal sanction to the application of interrogation techniques that U.S.
forces have consistently been trained are unlawful.
Memorandum from Jack L. Rives, Major Gen., U.S. Air Force, Deputy Judge Advocate Gen., to Air
Force Gen. Counsel (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf.
113. Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37
I.L.M. 22.
114. See Ricardo Bayon, Trading Futures in Dirty Air: Here’s a Market-Based Way to Fight
Global Warming, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2001, at B02 (arguing that President Bush should sign on to
the Kyoto Protocol in part because the emerging market in pollution credits is poised to be
extremely profitable); Jay Newton-Small & Jonathan D. Salant, GM, DuPont Adapt to Kyoto
Environmental Standards, BLOOMBERG NEWS SERV., Nov. 15, 2004, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=71000001&refer=us&sid=aSedVkbj0CwQ
(“Enron
Corp., DuPont, American Express Power Co. and other U.S. companies urged Bush to salvage parts
of the treaty, saying they viewed regulation as inevitable and they wanted credit for cutting their
emissions.”); see also Marianne Lavelle, A Shift in the Wind on Global Warming, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 19, 2001, at 39, 39 (“Many businesses active on global warming envision . . . a
market-based trading system that would allow farmers and others who cut carbon emissions to get
credits they could sell to carbon-emitting businesses.
Perhaps that’s why traditional
manufacturers . . . have joined forces with pro-regulatory groups like the Pew Center for Global
Climate Change.”).
115. See William Drozdiak, U.S. Firms Become “Green” Advocates: Global Warming Talks
Near End, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2000, at E1 (“Aidan Murphy, vice president at Shell International,
says the Kyoto treaty has prompted the British-Dutch oil company to shift some of its focus away
from petroleum toward alternative fuel sources.”).
116. For discussions of “soft law,” see, for example, Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal,
Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 53 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); Christine Chinkin,
Normative Development in the International Legal System, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE:
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analysis. Yet it is difficult to see how a state could hope to further its longterm interests without being able to convince others to follow certain policies
simply through the power of persuasion and moral authority. The problem is
that Goldsmith and Posner, because they simply assume a set of interests,
provide no way of choosing between these short-term and longer-term
interests. As Martha Finnemore has pointed out:
[I]t is all fine and well to assume that states want power, security, and
wealth, but what kind of power? Power for what ends? What kind of
security? What does security mean? How do you ensure or obtain it?
Similarly, what kind of wealth? Wealth for whom? How do you
obtain it?118
Goldsmith and Posner, like the neorealists and neoliberals before them, have
no answer to these questions. And, even worse, their framework does not
allow such questions to be raised.
To be sure, one can certainly find instances when international law does
appear to envision itself as a coercive set of rules meant to constrain states.
For example, the U.N. Charter lays out a use-of-force regime that is clearly
intended to prevent states from engaging in certain belligerent acts.119 And
we can readily concede that states might sometimes refuse to follow such
constraints—as with the Bush doctrine of preemptive war—though such
refusal may carry severe consequences to the nonconforming state.120 Thus,
when Goldsmith and Posner argue that such international law regimes do not,
in the end, stop states from pursuing their own interests, such a statement
may be true in a certain limited category of cases.
But just as importantly, many aspects of the international normative
order do not lend themselves to this type of framework. Indeed, by
excluding soft law, Goldsmith and Posner limit their field of vision to the
formal, state-centered international law regimes that are arguably playing a
less and less important role in the transnational order.121 Moreover, in many
cases, it is not that the international regime is constraining states but that the

THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 21 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000);
Dinah Shelton, Compliance with International Human Rights Soft Law, in INTERNATIONAL
COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 9 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997).
117. See, e.g., JOSEPH S. NYE, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S
ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE 9 (2002) (defining soft power as “getting others to want
what you want”).
118. FINNEMORE, supra note 13, at 1–2.
119. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
120. For example, other countries may withhold funds or manpower, and forging compromise
on a host of other issues may become more difficult.
121. See Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005) (discussing this expansion of international law to include less formal
transnational and international mechanisms).
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international regime creates the impetus for action in the first place. For
example:
Prior to the actions of UNESCO, most states, especially less
developed countries, had no notion that they needed or wanted a state
science bureaucracy. Similarly, European heads of state were not
particularly concerned about treatment of the war wounded until Henri
Dunant and the International Committee of the Red Cross made it an
issue. Global poverty alleviation, while long considered desirable in
the abstract, was not considered a pressing responsibility of states,
particularly of developed states, until the World Bank under Robert
McNamara made it a necessary part of development.122
Thus, the persuasive power of international norms caused states to develop
interests they might not otherwise have had.
In each of these instances, international law is shaping the
consciousness of state actors, not operating to constrain them from taking
actions they would otherwise pursue. Similarly, as Thomas Berger argues, in
Germany and Japan today, antimilitarism is as crucial to national identity as
militarism was in the World War II era.123 These are changes in the states’
conceptions of their own interests, influenced by the international legal
regime that Germany in particular has long championed. Again, the
important impact of such international regimes has no place in the
Goldsmith–Posner framework.
Indeed, Goldsmith and Posner go so far as to deny that the existence of
a legal norm or agreement necessarily changes the constitutive terms of the
relationships among nation–states. According to Goldsmith and Posner, even
a treaty exerts no “normative pull.”124 Rather, “[s]tates refrain from violating
treaties (when they do) for the same basic reason they refrain from violating
nonlegal agreements: because they fear retaliation from the other state or
some kind of reputational loss, or because they fear a failure of
coordination.”125 But once Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge that
reputational loss could factor into nation–state decisionmaking, they have
essentially conceded that the treaty regime does indeed have a normative
pull. This is because the potential reputational loss is made greater by the
existence of the treaty regime itself. The treaty effectively alters the terms of
the relationship among the parties and necessarily changes their bargaining
positions. The same is true of customary international law. Once a norm is
named a customary international law norm, then violation of that norm will
have far more serious reputational costs. This is not to say that states will
never violate such a customary norm, but rather that the naming of the norm

122. FINNEMORE, supra note 13, at 12.
123. THOMAS U. BERGER, CULTURES OF ANTIMILITARISM: NATIONAL SECURITY IN GERMANY
AND JAPAN 8–9 (1998).
124. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 90.
125. Id.
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itself makes violating the norm that much more difficult without suffering
consequences. Again, the international legal framework changes the
constitutive relationship among nation–states.
Goldsmith and Posner respond by saying that such reputational costs do
not amount to a true normative pull, and they liken a treaty to a nonbinding
letter of intent, which they argue does not itself cause parties to follow its
terms.126 But, of course, that is precisely how seemingly nonbinding letters
of intent do work. By stating an intent to do something, a party vastly
increases the likelihood of doing it because the statement of the intent to be
bound changes expectations of the parties and increases reputational costs for
noncompliance.127
Thus, while the Goldsmith–Posner framework has the advantage of
simplicity, we must be careful that simplicity does not devolve into
oversimplification or simplemindedness. We need a richer account of how
law actually operates, both domestically and internationally, than the
positivist vision Goldsmith and Posner assume. We imbibe legal norms and
cognitive categories even when we are not consciously aware of the norm in
question. We are persuaded by legal norms even when those norms are not
literally enforceable. We act in accordance with law because doing so has
become habitual, not because we seek to avoid sanction. We conceive of our
interrelations with others in terms of law because our long-term interests
require that we do so, even when our short-term interest might seem to
counsel otherwise. And the existence of a legal norm alters the constitutive
terms of our relationships with others as well as the costs of noncompliance.
All of these factors may be overcome in some circumstances. Indeed, people
sometimes violate domestic law just as states sometimes violate international
law. But in neither case does that mean that the law in question has no
significant constraining force. And only by thinking more broadly about
changes in legal consciousness and the complicated social, political, and
psychological factors that enter into the conceptualization of state interests
can we begin to understand how international law operates.
B. Multiple Constituencies and the Deployment of International Law
As discussed previously, Goldsmith and Posner treat the state as a
unitary “personality” with a single set of interests. But, of course, the real
world is far more messy, with a vast number of constituencies both within
the governmental bureaucracy and outside it. This cacophony of voices is
126. See id. at 90–91.
127. See, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 100
(1991) (arguing that states tend to view the nonbinding agreements that they enter into in good faith
as political or moral obligations upon which other states will rely and expect compliance); Peter M.
Haas, Why Comply, or Some Hypotheses in Search of an Analyst, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE
WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS, supra note 116, at 31, 33 (arguing that activities such as monitoring a
state’s compliance with a nonbinding agreement and direct verification of compliance may induce
that state to comply in order to avoid detection and potential criticism).
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important both because it challenges the seductive simplicity of the vision
offered by Goldsmith and Posner and because many of these voices, when
advocating policy positions, can use the moral authority or persuasive power
of international law norms for leverage. International law therefore becomes
a tool of empowerment for particular actors. These actors deploy
international law arguments strategically, and may gain more of a foothold
for their views because of international law. As a result, international law
has a significant impact in domestic foreign policy debates because it may
change the relative power of different interest groups seeking to shape that
policy.
For example, although the celebrated efforts of Spanish Judge Baltasar
Garzón to try former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet128 were not literally
“successful” because Pinochet was never extradited to Spain,129 they
strengthened the hands of human rights advocates within Chile itself and
provided the impetus for a movement that led to a Chilean Supreme Court
decision stripping Pinochet of his lifetime immunity.130 Likewise, Spanish
efforts to prosecute members of the Argentine military have bolstered

128. Judge Garzón issued an arrest order based on allegations of kidnappings, torture, and
planned disappearances of Chilean citizens and citizens of other countries. Spanish Request to
Arrest General Pinochet, Oct. 16, 1998, reprinted in THE PINOCHET PAPERS: THE CASE OF
AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN SPAIN AND BRITAIN 57–59 (Reed Brody & Michael Ratner eds., 2000)
[hereinafter THE PINOCHET PAPERS]. See also Anne Swardson, Pinochet, Pinochet Case Tries
Spanish Legal Establishment, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1998, at A27 (“As Chilean president from
1973 to 1990, Garzón’s arrest order said, Pinochet was ‘the leader of an international organization
created . . . to conceive, develop and execute the systematic planning of illegal detentions
[kidnappings], torture, forced relocations, assassinations and/or disappearances of numerous
persons, including Argentines, Spaniards, Britons, Americans, Chileans and other nationalities.’”).
On October 30, 1998, the Spanish National Court ruled unanimously that Spanish courts had
jurisdiction over the matter based both on the principle of universal jurisdiction (that crimes against
humanity can be tried anywhere at any time) and the passive personality principle of jurisdiction
(that courts may try cases if their nationals are victims of crime, regardless of where the crime was
committed). S Audiencia Nacional, Nov. 5, 1998 (No. 173/98), reprinted in THE PINOCHET
PAPERS, supra, at 95, 95–107. For an English translation of the opinion, see THE PINOCHET
PAPERS, supra, at 95, 95–107. The Office of the Special Prosecutor alleged that Spaniards living in
Chile were among those killed under Pinochet’s rule. Id. at 106.
129. Pinochet was physically in Great Britain. The British House of Lords ultimately ruled that
Pinochet was not entitled to head-of-state immunity for acts of torture and could be extradited to
Spain. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C.
147, 204–05 (H.L. 1999) (appeal taken from Q.B. Div’l Ct.) (holding that the International
Convention Against Torture, incorporated into United Kingdom law in 1988, prevented Pinochet
from claiming head-of-state immunity after 1988, because the universal jurisdiction contemplated
by the Convention is inconsistent with immunity for former heads of state). Nevertheless, the
British government refused to extradite, citing Pinochet’s failing health. See Jack Straw, Sec’y of
State Statement in the House of Commons (Mar. 2, 2000), in THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note
128, at 481, 482 (“[I]n the light of th[e] medical evidence . . . I . . . conclude[d] that no purpose
would be served by continuing the Spanish extradition request.”). Pinochet was eventually returned
to Chile.
130. See Chile’s Top Court Strips Pinochet of Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at A3
(“Chile’s Supreme Court stripped the former dictator Augusto Pinochet of immunity from
prosecution in a notorious human rights case on Thursday, raising hopes of victims that he may
finally face trial for abuses during his 17-year rule.”).
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reformers within the Argentine government, most notably President Nestor
Kirschner. In August 2003, Judge Garzón sought extradition from Argentina
of dozens of Argentines for human rights abuses committed under the
Argentine military government in the 1970s.131 In addition, Garzón
successfully sought extradition from Mexico of one former Argentine Navy
lieutenant who was accused of murdering hundreds of people.132 In the wake
of Garzón’s actions, realist observers complained that such transnational
prosecutions were illegitimate because Argentina had previously conferred
amnesty on those who had been involved in the period of military rule and
therefore any prosecution would infringe on Argentina’s sovereign “choice”
to grant amnesty.133
But the amnesty decision was not simply a unitary choice made by some
unified “state” of Argentina; it was a politically contested act that remained
controversial within the country.134 And the Spanish extradition request itself
gave President Kirschner more leverage in his tug-of-war with the legal
establishment over the amnesty laws. Just a month after Garzón’s request,
both houses of the Argentine Congress voted by large majorities to annul the
laws.135 Meanwhile the Spanish government decided that it would not make
the formal extradition request to Argentina that Garzón sought, but it did so
based primarily on the fact that Argentina had begun to scrap its amnesty
laws and the accused would therefore be subject to domestic human rights
prosecution.136 President Kirshner therefore could use Spain’s announcement
to increase pressure on the Argentine Supreme Court to officially overturn
the amnesty laws.137

131. See Larry Rohter, Argentine Congress Likely to Void “Dirty War” Amnesties, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2003, at A3 (recounting Garzón’s extradition request).
132. Emma Daly, Spanish Judge Sends Argentine to Prison on Genocide Charge, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 2003, at A3 (“In an unusual act of international judicial cooperation, and a victory for the
Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón, Mexico’s Supreme Court ruled this month that the former officer,
Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, could be extradited to Spain for crimes reportedly committed in a third
country, Argentina.”).
133. See David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Crimes Outside the World’s Jurisdiction, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2003, at A19 (noting that Argentina had granted amnesty to Cavallo and arguing
that “Judge Garzón is essentially ignoring Argentina’s own history and desires”).
134. The Argentine army, for example, made known its desire for amnesty for human rights
abuses through several revolts in the late 1980s. The Argentine Congress granted amnesty after one
such uprising in 1987. See Joseph B. Treaster, Argentine President Orders Troops To End Revolt,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1988, § 1, at 13 (describing an army revolt in Buenos Aires).
135. Argentina’s Day of Reckoning, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 24, 2004, at C26.
136. Elizabeth Nash, Garzón Blocked Over “Dirty War” Extraditions, THE INDEPENDENT,
Aug. 30, 2003, at 14; see also Al Goodman, Spain Blocks Trials of Argentines, CNN.COM, Aug. 29,
2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/08/29/spanish.argentina/index.html (quoting the
Spanish attorney for the victims saying that the Spanish government’s decision sends a “powerful
message” to Argentina’s Supreme Court to overturn the amnesty laws).
137. See Héctor Tobar, Judge Orders Officers Freed: The Argentine Military Men Accused of
Rights Abuses in the ‘70s and ‘80s May Still Face Trials, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2003, at A3
(“President Nestor Kirchner used Spain’s announcement to increase pressure on the Argentine
Supreme Court to overturn the amnesty laws that prohibit trying the men here.”).
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Finally, on June 14, 2005, the Argentine Supreme Court did in fact
strike down the amnesty laws, thus clearing the way for domestic human
rights prosecutions.138 Not only was the pressure exerted by Spain
instrumental in these efforts, but it is significant that the Argentine Court
cited as legal precedent a 2001 decision of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights striking down a similar amnesty provision in Peru as
incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights and hence
without legal effect.139 So, in the end, the “sovereign” state of Argentina
made political and legal choices to repeal the amnesty laws just as it had
previously made choices to create them. But in this change of heart we can
see the degree to which international legal pronouncements, even if they are
without any literal constraining effect, may significantly alter the domestic
political terrain.
Likewise, official international institutions, such as the U.N., can also
pressure local bureaucracies, for example, by creating international
commissions of inquiry concerning alleged atrocities, or by threatening
prosecutions in international courts. Such declarations can empower
reformers within local bureaucracies, who can then argue for institutional
changes as a way of staving off international interference. For example, in
the aftermath of the violence in East Timor that followed its vote for
independence, there were grave concerns that the Indonesian government
would not pursue human rights investigations of the military personnel
allegedly responsible for the violence.140 Thus, an International Commission
of Inquiry was established, and U.N. officials warned that an international
court might be necessary.141 As with Chile and Argentina, such actions
strengthened the hand of reformers within Indonesia, such as then-Attorney
General Marzuki Darusman. With the specter of international action hanging
over Indonesia, Darusman made several statements arguing that, for
nationalist reasons, a hard-hitting Indonesian investigation was necessary in
order to forestall an international takeover of the process.142
Not
138. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, “Simón, Julio Héctor y otros s/ privación
ilegítima de la libertad,” causa No. 17.768, S.1767.XXXVIII (Arg.). See also Press Release,
Human Rights Watch, Argentina: Amnesty Laws Struck Down (June 14, 2005), available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/14/argent11119.htm.
139. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, “Simón, Julio Héctor y otros s/ privación
ilegítima de la libertad,” causa No. 17.768, S.1767.XXXVIII (Arg.). See also Press Release, supra
note 138.
140. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Dance of Complementarity: Relationships Among
Domestic, International, and Transnational Accountability Mechanisms in East Timor and
Indonesia, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
319, 358–61 (Jane E. Stromseth ed., 2003) (discussing ways in which international pressure on
Indonesia in the period just after East Timor gained its independence strengthened the hand of
reformers within the Indonesian government to push for robust domestic accountability mechanisms
for atrocities committed during the period leading up to the independence vote).
141. Id. at 358–59.
142. See id. at 360 (documenting the response of the Indonesian government, which appointed
an investigative team, identified priority cases, named suspects, and collected evidence).
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surprisingly, when this international pressure dissipated after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, so did the momentum to provide real
accountability in Indonesia for the atrocities committed.143 Thus, we can
again see that international legal activity (or the lack of it) alters the domestic
terrain.
Indeed, even in the United States, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals recently stayed an execution,144 based in part on a prior decision of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations,145 despite the fact that the ICJ had no means of literally
enforcing its decision in Oklahoma. Likewise, the Bush administration
ultimately issued a directive that state courts should comply with the ICJ
decision.146 And in the trade context, although ad hoc tribunals convened
under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
have no authority to directly reverse the decisions of national courts or create
formally binding precedent, Robert Ahdieh has argued that, over time, we
may see the interactions between the NAFTA panels and national courts take
on a dialectical quality that is neither the direct hierarchical review
traditionally undertaken by appellate courts, nor simply the dialogue that
often occurs under the doctrine of comity.147 Instead, Ahdieh predicts that
international courts are likely to exert an important influence even as the
national courts retain formal independence, much as U.S. federal courts
exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction may influence state court
interpretations of U.S. constitutional norms in criminal cases.148 In turn, the
143. See id. at 364–66 (discussing the shifting priorities of the Bush administration following
the 9/11 attacks and tracing the impact of outside pressure in efforts to hold individuals accountable
for the violence in East Timor).
144. Torres v. Oklahoma (Torres II), No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004)
(unpublished order) (order granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing).
145. Id. (Chapel, J., concurring) (stating his belief that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals was bound by the ICJ’s decision in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United
States), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31)). The same day the stay was granted, the governor of Oklahoma
commuted the defendant’s death sentence, stating in a press release: “I took into account the fact
that the U.S. signed the 1963 Vienna Convention and is part of that treaty.” Press Release, Office of
Governor Brad Henry, Gov. Henry Grants Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.governor.state.ok.us/
display_article.php?article_id=301&article_type=1.
The press release also stated that the
Governor’s office had been contacted by the U.S. State Department. Id.
146. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
(Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html.
Of course, the administration also sought to undermine the ICJ by announcing its intention to
withdraw from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, which gives the ICJ jurisdiction
over disputes concerning the Convention. See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases,
WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A01. There can be little doubt, however, that the international court
judgment at the very least changed the state of political and legal play concerning compliance with
the Vienna Convention.
147. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National
Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2032–34 (2004) (arguing that NAFTA tribunals and U.S. state
courts operate in dialectical relationship to each other).
148. Id. at 2034.
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decisions of national courts may also come to influence international
tribunals. This dialectical relationship, if it emerges, will exist without an
official hierarchical relationship based on coercive power.149
Finally, there can be little doubt that local actors, outside of official
government bureaucracies or judicial institutions, can at times leverage
international legal norms to press causes within their countries.150 For
example, as late as 1994, women in Hong Kong were unable to inherit
land.151 That year a group of rural indigenous women joined forces with
urban women’s groups to demand legal change. As detailed by Sally Engle
Merry and Rachel E. Stern, “[t]he indigenous women slowly shifted from
seeing their stories as individual kinship violations to broader examples of
discrimination.”152 Ultimately, the women learned to protest these unjust
customary laws in the language of international human rights and gender
equality.153 Having done so, they were successful at getting the inheritance
rules overturned.154 While we might regret the fact that these women were
forced to “translate” their grievances into an internationally recognized
language in order to be heard, the success of the movement in accessing
political power surely attests to the strength and importance of the
international law discourse.
This same story has been replicated numerous times around the world.
Assisted by a global network of NGOs and activists, indigenous movements
use international norms to influence local political or judicial actors. In June
2005, communities from across the Niger Delta filed a case in the Federal
High Court of Nigeria against several oil companies to stop the practice of
“gas flaring,” which poses severe health risks and contributes to greenhouse
gas emissions.155
Though nominally brought under the Nigerian
149. To be sure, Chapter 11 tribunals do have the power to issue damage awards that private
litigants can then enforce against federal authorities, but there is no direct review of the state court
decision nor any mechanism of coercive power that can be exercised against any state officials or
judicial actors. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, art.
1135, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) (outlining remedies
available under Chapter 11).
150. Of course, such local actors do not only “use” international law as “given” to them, but
also, through their social movements, shape the international legal norms themselves. For an
argument that human rights discourse has been fundamentally shaped by Third World resistance to
development, see generally BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW:
DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003).
151. Sally Engle Merry & Rachel E. Stern, The Female Inheritance Movement in Hong Kong:
Theorizing the Local/Global Interface, 46 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 387, 387 (2005).
152. Id. at 399.
153. See id. at 390 (explaining the evolution of the Anti-Discrimination Female Indigenous
Residents Committee from a group that perceived the prohibition of female inheritance as a
personal wrong perpetrated by relatives to a group arguing that the male-only inheritance laws
failed to comply with international agreements, such as the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
154. Id. at 394.
155. Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nig., Suit No. FHC/B/CS/153/2005. On November
14, 2005, the Federal High Court of Nigeria in Benin City ruled that Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron,
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Constitution, the complaint explicitly references the African Charter on
Human and People’s Rights and argues for a right to a “clean, poison-free,
pollution free and healthy environment.”156 Other environmental groups seek
to have sites placed on UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee list of
protected sites so that they can then pressure their local governments to take
steps to limit environmental damage to the sites.157 Consumer groups
organize worldwide boycotts on the rhetorical strength of rights discourse.158
Meanwhile, many African countries, responding in part to pressure from
international human rights activists, have recently enacted laws forbidding
the practice known as female genital cutting.159 And of course, it isn’t only
social movements that use the language and institutions of international law
to access domestic power. Thus, transnational corporations have deployed
the rhetoric of international free trade law and have used bodies such as the
NAFTA tribunals or the World Trade Organization to avoid being subject to
domestic regulation.160
Regardless of whether or not one thinks the proliferation and
deployment of international norms in domestic political and legal debates is a
Exxon Mobil, and other oil companies must end natural gas flaring in Nigeria, claiming that the
practice was a waste and violated the local communities’ constitutional rights to life and dignity. A
copy of the judicial order is available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/media/
gas.flaring.suit.nov2005/ni.shell.nov05.decision.pdf.
156. Complaint at 4, Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nig., Suit No. FHC/B/CS/153/2005,
available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/gas.flaring.suit/case.pleadings.20June2005.pdf.
157. For example, the countries of Belize, Nepal, and Peru recently petitioned the World
Heritage Committee to place the Belize Barrier Reef, Mount Everest, and Huarascan National
Park on its list of World Heritage in Danger Sites, because of threats to the sites due to global
climate change. See Press Release, Climate Justice, UNESCO Danger-Listing Petitions Presented
(Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/UNESCO.petitions.release.
“Danger-listing” is a legal mechanism under the Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151, which
requires State Parties to the Convention to take action to transmit World Heritage Sites to future
generations.
158. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 480–
82 (2002) (discussing such efforts). As The Economist has observed, “a multinational’s failure to
look like a good global citizen is increasingly expensive in a world where consumers and pressure
groups can be quickly mobilised behind a cause.” Multinationals and Their Morals, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 2–8, 1995, at 18–19. For discussion of how noncompliance with entrenched international law
norms may result in lost economic opportunities for subnational units, crucial to economic
prosperity in a globalized economy, see Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs)
Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 672–73 (2002), in which he outlines ways that consumers, nongovernmental organizations, and states can pressure corporations to boycott investment and
development in regions that fail to follow standards of international law.
159. Leigh A. Trueblood, Female Genital Mutilation: A Discussion of International Human
Rights Instruments, Cultural Sovereignty and Dominance Theory, 28 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
437, 464–65 (2000) (describing how the efforts of international organizations, NGOs, and other
groups have led many countries, including Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and
Ivory Coast, to pass legislation against female genital cutting).
160. See, e.g., Benjamin W. Putnam, Note, The Cross-Border Trucking Dispute: Finding a Way
Out of the Conflict Between NAFTA and U.S. Environmental Law, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 1287, 1307–
08 (2004) (describing cases in which regulated entities cite NAFTA to avoid the requirements of
domestic environmental laws).
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good thing, it is difficult to deny the trend. Thus, the interaction between the
international and the local cannot simply be viewed as Goldsmith and Posner
view it: a state pursuing a single set of interests either completely constrained
or completely unconstrained by international norms. Rather, as part of the
multivalent, messy process by which various state constituencies vie to have
their preferred policies adopted, international legal norms are a powerful
tool. These norms provide a set of moral, rhetorical, and strategic arguments
that may empower constituencies that might not otherwise have a voice, or
they may be used by already powerful forces to protect their own interests.
In any event, only by going beyond the simplistic model of the unitary state
pursuing a single set of interests can we see the power of international law
coursing below the surface.
III. A Cosmopolitan Alternative
Goldsmith and Posner reject a cosmopolitan vision of international legal
ordering, which they define as the requirement that states act based on
global, rather than state, welfare. In conceptualizing cosmopolitanism in this
way, they join other scholars on both the left and right in assuming that
cosmopolitanism is equivalent to universalism.161 Yet cosmopolitanism does
not require a belief in a single global welfare or even a single universal set of
governing norms, nor does it necessarily require that global welfare trump
state welfare. Indeed, cosmopolitanism is not at all incompatible with the
idea of nation–states, nor does it assume that the state is somehow
unimportant. Thus, Goldsmith and Posner provide a caricatured vision of
cosmopolitanism. This is a shame, because a more nuanced understanding of
cosmopolitan theory offers a useful framework for conceptualizing the
interplay of multiple actors in the transnational system we see operating
today. Indeed, cosmopolitanism may in fact offer a more useful framework
than the reductionist, state-centric vision Goldsmith and Posner offer.
Cosmopolitanism is a useful trope for conceptualizing the current period
of interaction across territorial borders precisely because it recognizes that
people have multiple affiliations, extending from the local to the global (and
many nonterritorial affiliations as well). For example, Martha Nussbaum has
stressed that cosmopolitanism does not require one to give up local
identifications, which, she acknowledges, “can be a source of great richness

161. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 4, at 879 (“Rather than aspiring to universal cosmopolitanism,
statelessness may well foster reversion to a selfish individualism.”) (emphasis added); see also
Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETHICS 516, 534 (1994) (“If I were a European
right now, I hope I would have the guts to stand up for rootless cosmopolitanism: forget this
nationalistic claptrap, and let us build a world worthy of free and equal human beings.”); Anupam
Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1046 (2001) (“The cosmopolitan model . . .
dissolves the multirootedness of diasporas into a global identity.”).
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in life.”162 Rather, following the Stoics, she suggests that we think of
ourselves as surrounded by a series of concentric circles:
The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family,
then follows the extended family, then, in order, neighbors or local
groups, fellow city-dwellers, and fellow countrymen—and we can
easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical,
professional, gender, or sexual identities. Outside all these circles is
the largest one, humanity as a whole.163
Therefore, we need not relinquish special affiliations and identifications with
the various groups of which we may feel a part.164
In this vision, people could be “cosmopolitan patriots,” accepting their
responsibility to nurture the culture and politics of their home community,
while at the same time recognizing that such cultural practices are always
shifting, as people move from place to place or are increasingly affected by
spatially distant actors.165 “The result would be a world in which each local
form of human life is the result of long-term and persistent processes of
cultural hybridization—a world, in that respect, much like the world we live
in now.”166
Thus, cosmopolitanism is emphatically not a model of international
citizenship in the sense of international harmonization and standardization,
but is instead a recognition of multiple refracted differences where people
acknowledge links with the “other” without demanding assimilation or
ostracism. Cosmopolitanism seeks “flexible citizenship,” in which people
are permitted to shift identities amid a plurality of possible affiliations and
allegiances, including nonterritorial communities.167 The cosmopolitan
worldview shifts back and forth from the rooted particularity of personal
identity to the global possibility of multiple overlapping communities.
“[I]nstead of an ideal of detachment, actually existing cosmopolitanism is a
reality of (re)attachment, multiple attachment, or attachment at a distance.”168
A cosmopolitan conception of law, therefore, aims to capture a middle
ground between strict territorialism on the one hand and expansive

162. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY:
DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 2, 9 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996).
163. Id.
164. See id. (“We need not think of [local affiliations] as superficial, and we may think of our
identity as constituted partly by them.”).
165. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, in COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND
FEELING BEYOND THE NATION 91, 91–92 (Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., 1998) [hereinafter
COSMOPOLITICS].
166. Id. at 92.
167. See AIHWA ONG, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP: THE CULTURAL LOGICS OF
TRANSNATIONALITY 6 (1999) (describing how “the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation,
travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing
political-economic conditions” foster a form of transnationality she calls “flexible citizenship”).
168. Bruce Robbins, Introduction Part I: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism, in
COSMOPOLITICS, supra note 165, at 1, 3.
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universalism on the other. A territorialist approach fails to account for the
wide variety of community affiliations and social interactions that defy
territorial boundaries. A more universalist perspective, by contrast, which
seeks to imagine people as world citizens first and foremost, might seem to
be a useful alternative. But such universalism tends to presuppose a world
citizenry devoid of both particularist ties and normative discussion about the
relative importance of such ties. Thus, universalism cuts off debate about the
nature of overlapping communities just as surely as territorialism does.
A cosmopolitan conception, in contrast, makes no attempt to deny the
multirooted nature of individuals within a variety of communities, both
territorial and nonterritorial. Thus, although a cosmopolitan conception
might acknowledge the potential importance of asserting universal norms in
specific circumstances, it does not require a universalist belief in a single
world community. As a result, cosmopolitanism offers a promising rubric
for analyzing law in a world of diverse normative voices.
For example, with regard to jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition
of judgments, I have argued elsewhere that a cosmopolitan perspective would
allow courts to look at the relevant community affiliation of the parties rather
than undertake a formalist exercise in counting literal contacts with a
territorial entity.169
More broadly, cosmopolitanism allows us to
conceptualize a broader practice that I call jurispersuasion, in which legal
and quasi-legal actors assert jurisdiction and express norms even without
literal enforcement power.170 These actors draw on epistemic community
affiliations to persuade others to enforce their judgments or normative
statements. As constructivists have recognized, “[n]ormative claims become
powerful and prevail by being persuasive; being persuasive means grounding
claims in existing norms in ways that emphasize normative congruence and
coherence.”171 Cosmopolitanism, far more than rational choice theory,
attempts to capture this multivalent process of norm development and
persuasion across territorial borders.
Indeed, though the model of international cooperation among states that
Goldsmith and Posner envision has a contractarian cast, their model is
strictly that of a series of isolated transactional contracts: parties see a
mutual interest in cooperating and thus agree to cooperate. This is a
peculiarly thin model of contract, however, and it underestimates the ways in
which new interests can grow out of the contracting process itself.
Drawing on the scholarly literature concerning relational contract, in
contrast, we may come to see the agreement to cooperate as the first step in
creating a contractors’ community that over time begins to develop new

169. See Berman, supra note 158, at 322 (discussing jurisdiction); Paul Schiff Berman,
Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global
Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1839–67 (discussing choice of law and recognition of judgments).
170. For further discussion of jurispersuasion, see Berman, supra note 121, at 533–38.
171. FINNEMORE, supra note 13, at 141.
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norms of reciprocity and loyalty, along with a concomitant interest in
fostering and protecting both the community itself and those emerging
norms.172 Thus, as transnational groups work together to cooperate and solve
specific problems, staffs of personnel are created, and these staff members
tend to be inculcated in the norms of the group and invested in maintaining
relations with each other. As a result, transnational networks of government
bureaucrats, trade-promoting groups, human rights NGOs, and the like form
de facto cosmopolitan communities, affiliations of people who have come to
see that the welfare of their state is interlinked with the welfare of others, and
that evaluations of “utility” or “interest” are interdependent. This is an
enlarged vision of where a state’s interest lies, organically evolved from
agreements motivated by more short-term and immediate objectives.
Thus, cosmopolitanism need not be seen as a moral call to have states
adopt global standards of well-being while denying state interest. To the
contrary, cosmopolitanism recognizes the important historical and emotional
pull of the state. In addition, it celebrates diverse normative orders in
multiple communities and need not insist on homogenizing that diversity into
one global culture or one international legal framework.
But state communities are not the only salient community affiliations
people possess, and we need a framework to account for the multiple
overlapping community assertions that regularly take place, particularly in an
era of globalization. Whether we are talking about courts being influenced
by other courts around the world, ethnic groups or transnational norm
entrepreneurs asserting norms across territorial borders, the melding of legal
norms that takes place in liminal areas, or the development of transnational
non-state lawmaking, there can be little doubt that the state is only one
community affiliation among many. And while a more detailed discussion of
this cosmopolitan framework is beyond the scope of this brief Book Review
Essay, it seems clear that any useful framework for understanding law on the
world stage must examine these multiple voices. Cosmopolitanism permits,
and encourages, such study, while the rational choice theory of Goldsmith
and Posner reductively excludes all voices other than that of the unitary state.
IV. Conclusion
There remains much work to be done, of course, to analyze more fully
the myriad ways that international legal norms may affect cognitive
categories, conceptions of interests, domestic decisionmaking processes, and
the creation of cosmopolitan communities. But such study will necessarily
take place far beyond the limited vision of international law that Goldsmith

172. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and Associations: Why the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Misfired, 22 YALE J. REG. 315, 324 (2005) (noting that in
relational contracts, virtually all daily decisions within the general parameters of the deal “are
resolved in a continuous and ongoing relationship that depends on some high level of trust and
cooperation”).
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and Posner construct. By refusing at the outset even to consider the ways
international law might affect state decisionmaking short of outright
coercion, Goldsmith and Posner ensure that no possible role for international
law will be found beyond simply as a tool for state self interest.
Thus, The Limits of International Law is not, in the end, a descriptive
account of how international law works, but a normative vision advancing an
ideology of international relations realism. Ironically, though Goldsmith and
Posner refuse to recognize the ways international law may shape legal
consciousness, they themselves are nevertheless attempting to affect legal
consciousness in the United States. They fear that the moral force of
international legal norms will galvanize opposition to state policies, so they
wish to persuade readers that such force does not and should not exist.
But saying it does not make it so. State interests do not operate in
isolation from social and psychological realities. Likewise, state interests are
not unitary. They arise through complicated processes of norm generation
and multivalent disputes over policy. As a result, the reductionist model of
game theoretic interaction among states pursuing single interests in clearly
defined contexts simply has no basis in the real world.
So, while no one would say that international law binds all states all the
time, international legal norms are part of the context within which state
decisions are made, and they provide a set of arguments for domestic
constituencies to draw upon in advancing policies. Moreover, international
cooperation and international norms create and foster epistemic communities,
transnational groups who, over time, come to conceive of themselves as
bound up with others across nation–state borders. These are the processes of
cosmopolitan norm development that scholars must continue to study. But in
order to do so, we must expand our vision of international law far beyond the
limits that Goldsmith and Posner seek to impose.

